gōbišn abar gōbāgīh | A treatise on logic (Paul the Persian)-(GG)

gōbišn abar gōbāgīh

I

A Treatise on Aristotle’s Logic

<I. Introduction to philosophy>

II

1. fradum, hān ī pediš mardōmān hāmōyēn ō ēk mardōm ud ēk tōhmag guft bavend, cōn jehūdagān ī-šān tōhmag ō abrāhām;

2. didīg, hān ī pediš az kū-gyāg ī kas gufsed, cōn ēd ī ka gōbem «vahmān hūzīg ped tōhmag», ud «avāhmān māyīg ped tōhmag»;

3. sidīg, hān ī ast [ōn cōn] bahr ī tōhmag ī mardōmān, frazānagān nihād, u-š acārīhā ped gōbāgīh andar abāyed. u-šān [tōhmag] ōh vimandēnīd: ēd cē abar vasān judsardagān ped hān ī ast vāxted. ōn cōn «stōr»; cē «stōr» abar asp ud xar ud abārīg ham cōn-šān tōhmag vāxted; ud vasyār hend ud ēk az did juttar ped sardag, bē ped stōrīh ēk tis hend, ud agar ō amāh pursend kū «cē ast asp?», pesox kunem kū «stōr ast»;

1. naxvist, amaragānīhā ud ped visānišnīg jadišn baved, cōn «nišastan» ud «ēstādan» ud «raftan»;

2. ud didīgar, vāspuhragānīhā ud ped avisānišnīg jadišn baved, cōn «rēš ī ped tan» ud «hamōnvēnīgīh»;

3. ud sidīgar, vāspuhragānīhādar ud ped vimand ī xīrān gōbīhed, cōn «gōbāgīh» ud «agōbāgīh».

<II. Isagoge>

1. One sort concerns the multitude of all those men who have alliance to each other from one man or one genus; for example, the genus of all Jews is linked to Abraham.

2. Another sort concerns the place from whence a man comes; for example, when we say that so-and-so is an Hūzian (an Elamite) by genus, and the other is a Median by genus.

3. The third which concerns a part of the genus [as genus] –the genus of human beings – is set by philosophers, and it is necessarily required in logic. It is defined by them thus: That which is predicated of several items differing in species, as such. For example, “large-domestic-animal”. Large-domestic-animal, being a genus, is indeed predicated of horse and donkey and others like these; they are several [in number] and differ from one another in species, nevertheless in [their] being large domestic animals they are one [and the same] thing. And if we are asked, “What is a horse?”, we answer “It is a large domestic animal.”

1. One, an item is commonly different [from a diverse item] in virtue of some separable accident, for example, “to sit down”, “to stand up”, and “to walk”;

2. Another, an item is properly different [from a diverse item] with respect to some inseparable accident, for example, “a sore on the body”, “being snub-nosed”;

3. And the third, an item is said most properly [different from a diverse item], with respect to the definition of things (that is, it varies by specific difference), for example, “being rational” and “being non-rational”.
   

III

1. hān ī nēst andar tis, bē-š harv tis andar;

2. ud hān ī-š nām ud vimand dahed ō harv tis ī abar-š gufsed;

3. u-d hān ī-š nēst hambun-z pedīrag;

4. ud hān ī-š andar nēst vēšīh ud kamīh;

5. ud hān ī ēvāz ēd tis nišānēned;

6. ud hān ī ka ēk ud ham, ēg pedīragān pedīrišnīg baved.

<III. Categories>

1. That which is not in a thing (subject), but everything is in it;

2. That which gives its name and definition to all things which are said of it;

3. That which has nothing contrary to it;

4. That in which there is neither the state of being more (excess) nor the state of being less (deficiency);

5. That which signifies “this thing” only;

6. That which, when it is one and the same, is able to receive contraries.

IV

<IV. On Interpretation>

V

<V. Prior Analytics>